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INTRODUCTION 
In 2014 and 2015, over $1.2 trillion was invested in private equity, 
the industry’s greatest mark since the financial crisis.1 The steady level 
of near-zero percent interest rates in recent years has certainly helped 
the industry. In the typical leveraged buyout, the private equity firm will 
buy a public or private company using about 60% to 90% debt financing 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Dan Primack, 2014 Was a Huge Year for M&A and Private Equity, FORTUNE, 
(Jan. 5, 2015, 11:56 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/05/2014-was-a-huge-year-for-
ma-and-private-equity/ [http://perma.cc/43BD-8CEZ]; PE by the Numbers, AM. INV. 
COUNCIL, http://www.investmentcouncil.org/private-equity-at-work/education/pe-by-th 
e-numbers/ [http://perma.cc/34EP-3TV7] (last updated Mar. 2016). 
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mainly provided by banks.2 With the cost of borrowing so low, private 
equity managers have been able to expand their investing power, 
resulting in steady investment in private equity while other sectors of the 
economy have struggled.3 
In the months following the U.S. financial crisis, the Federal 
Reserve instituted its own set of crisis-related special programs, such as 
the substantial purchase of long-term securities, which put pressure on 
longer-term interest rates and eased overall financial conditions. 4 
Consistently low interest rates set the stage for recovery over the past 
seven years. 5  More specifically, these rates have had an impact in 
private investment, and the private equity market, by spurning much 
debate about taxing private equity and handling liability for the 
underlying investments. 6 While most of the debate has centered on how 
to tax private equity, this Note focuses on issues of liability for 
underlying portfolio company debt obligations. 
Private equity activity has seen its fair share of borderline predatory 
overleveraging since the financial crisis. 7  However, this problem 
remains unaddressed by Congress, federal agencies, and the states.8 On 
                                                                                                                           
 2. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, J. 
ECON. PERSPS., Winter 2009, at 121, 124. 
 3. See PE by the Numbers, supra note 1. 
 4. The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Financial Crisis and Actions to Foster 
Maximum Employment and Price Stability, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm [http://per 
ma.cc/FMK7-JWHS] (last updated June 4, 2015). 
 5. Caroline Baum, This Economy Needs Ultra-Low Interest Rates Just to Stay 
Afloat, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 25, 2015, 8:23 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story 
/this-economy-needs-ultra-low-interest-rates-just-to-stay-afloat-2015-11-25 [http://perm 
a.cc/34W4-DP8R]. 
 6. See generally William D. Cohan, Low Interest Rates Help Private-Equity 
Moguls and Hurt Average Americans, THE NATION (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.thenati 
on.com/article/low-interest-rates-help-private-equity-moguls-and-hurt-average-america 
ns/ [http://perma.cc/9Z7Z-9Y5R]. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See generally Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Five Years On: Regulation of 
Private Fund Advisers After Dodd-Frank, Keynote Address at the Managed Fund 
Association (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/white-regulation-of-
private-fund-advisers-after-dodd-frank.html [http://perma.cc/Q448-98YH]; EILEEN 
APPELBAUM, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, PRIVATE EQUITY AND THE SEC 
AFTER DODD-FRANK (2015), http://cepr.net/documents/pe-dodd-frank-2015-01.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/C22Z-2M6X]. 
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multiple occasions, private equity giants have added struggling 
companies to their portfolios; once in their possession, the firm 
essentially strips down the company, issuing more debt than it can 
handle and channeling the proceeds from the issuance to the general 
partners. 9  The company is then left unable to pay interest on the 
outstanding debt. Accordingly, with decreasing rates, the amount of 
equity financing in leveraged buyouts, where funds typically borrow 
outside money, has also steadily decreased as firms opt to secure 
cheaper debt.10 The result of such an increase in debt financing has led 
to more and more portfolio companies overleveraging and eventually 
having to file for bankruptcy.11 This Note addresses the overleveraging 
of portfolio companies, how the private equity fund structure allows for 
it, and how to recover lost funds firms poach from these companies. 
Part I discusses private equity funds and their limited partnership 
structure, as well as the relevant tax and bankruptcy law provisions that 
allow for debt financing. This section takes a look at the tax and liability 
benefits of the limited partnership structure, and then it explains the 
current policy debate regarding the treatment of private equity fund 
income and other private equity tax issues. It concludes by looking at 
two ways courts have ensured that private equity firms be held liable for 
their portfolio company debts. Part II consists of two case studies: 
Hellas Communications and Colt Defense, both of which were bought 
up by private equity funds, overleveraged, and restructured. Hellas 
Communications, a Greek telecommunications services provider, filed 
for bankruptcy in 2007, and although the company recently emerged 
from restructuring, it has remained the subject of multiple law suits in 
different continents for many years. On the other hand, Colt Defense, a 
nearly 200-year-old American weapon manufacturer, entered 
reorganization in the summer of 2015 and emerged healthy from 
bankruptcy in 2016. This section ends by addressing the current market 
trends of exit strategies and the role that debt financing has played in 
influencing certain strategies. Part III advocates for a solution in which 
                                                                                                                           
 9. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 115, 126–27 (2013). 
 10. PE by the Numbers, supra note 1. 
 11. Arleen Jacobius, Private Equity Fund Restructurings on the Rise, Survey Says, 
PENSIONS & INVS. (June 7, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20150607/ 
ONLINE/150609891/private-equity-fund-restructurings-on-the-rise-survey-says [http:// 
perma.cc/H4GC-LVTS]. 
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sophisticated contracting parties take it upon themselves to ensure they 
do not suffer a windfall. 
I. PRIVATE EQUITY FUND STRUCTURE AND LAWS 
A. REFRESHER ON THE STRUCTURE OF FUNDS & THEIR TAX BENEFITS 
1. Fund Structure: Limited Partnership as a Liability Shield 
Most domestic private equity funds are organized as limited 
partnerships, usually in Delaware, and as such contain at least one 
general partner and at least one limited partner.12 The private equity fund 
itself is “a pool of capital with no operations.”13 In its simplest form, the 
firm managing the fund acts as the general partner, while the investors 
act as the limited partners.14 The general partner (unless expressly set in 
the partnership agreement) has unlimited liability and assumes the debts 
and obligations of the funds, which is therefore usually organized as a 
limited liability entity (either an LP or LLC). 15 Within this structure, the 
members or managers of the limited liability entity are typically 
members or managers of the firm itself.16 On the other hand, the limited 
partners—sophisticated and institutional investors—enjoy the benefits 
of limited liability, and are only liable for the amount of their capital 
                                                                                                                           
 12. JAMES M. SCHELL ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND 
OPERATIONS § 3.01 (2016). See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-101 to 17-1111 
(2016). For a graphical representation of this structure, see Mariya Stefanova, Private 
Equity Structures and Their Impact on Private Equity Accounting and Reporting, FIN. 
TIMES PRESS (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2316387 
&seqNum=2 [http://perma.cc/63F8-BUM4]. 
 13. Scott W. Naidech, Private Equity Fund Formation, PRAC. L. CO. (2011), 
http://www.msaworldwide.com/Naidech_PrivateEquityFundFormation_Nov11.pdf [htt 
p://perma.cc/M2AM-5FPN]. 
 14. Steven N. Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, 
Persistence, and Capital Flows, 60 J. FINANCE 1791, 1793 (2005); Amanda N. Persaud 
& Adrienne Atkinson, Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of the Structural, ERISA, 
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues, in INVESTMENT ADVISOR REGULATION: A STEP-
BY-STEP GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW § 47:1 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 3d ed. 
2012). 
 15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-403(b); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 2. 
 16. John J. McDonald, Actions that Private Equity Fund Representatives on 
Portfolio Company Boards Can Take to Help Avoid Liability, J. PRIV. EQUITY, Fall 
2008, at 1. 
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contribution.17 An investment advisor, usually affiliated with the private 
equity firm (the general partner), provides investment management 
services to the fund. The investment advisor employs “investment 
professionals, evaluates potential investment opportunities and incurs 
the expenses associated with day-to-day operations and administration 
of the fund.”18 When the general partner decides to acquire a company 
through a leveraged buyout, the firm will put some of its own capital 
into the fund, and the fund will acquire debt financing from a bank to 
buy up the target company’s shares or buy out the firm’s owners.19 After 
such financing, the fund itself will own the company, and the general 
partner can carry out its target strategy to create value.20 
Another advantage of the limited partnership structure is that when 
the fund seeks debt financing through the fund itself, the firm is able to 
sever liability for any future default by the fund. The debt liabilities 
become those of the portfolio companies, by virtue of its ownership by 
the fund and the structure of the general partner as a limited liability 
company, enjoying pass-through taxation and a liability shield from the 
fund’s debts exceeding the general partner’s committed capital.21 
As evidenced, limited partnerships favor broad freedom to contract, 
and this also applies to general partner fiduciary duties with respect to 
the partnership. 22  The Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
provides that a partner’s fiduciary duties may be expanded, restricted, or 
altogether eliminated by contract, with the exception of the implied duty 
of good faith and fair dealing.23 The Delaware courts have upheld the LP 
                                                                                                                           
 17. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303. 
 18. Naidech, supra note 13. 
 19. Mark Koba, Private Equity: CNBC Explains, CNBC (Jan. 24, 2013, 2:50 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100405662 [http://perma.cc/P8FB-SQAW]. 
 20. See id. 
 21. SCHELL ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.01[3]. 
 22. Srinivas M. Raju & Jillian G. Remming, Fiduciary Duties in the Alternative 
Entity Context, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 16, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/c 
ommittees/commercial/articles/summer2012-0812-fiduciary-duties-alternative-entity.ht 
ml [http://perma.cc/YDS9-SYBM]. 
 23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2016) (“To the extent that, at law or in 
equity, a partner or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited 
partnership or to another partner . . . the partner’s or other person’s duties may be 
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement; 
provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). It is also important to note, as many private 
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and LLC’s freedom to eliminate fiduciary duties, including those 
available at common law.24 
2. Debt Financing as a Tax Deductible Expense 
Private equity debt financing is tax efficient because of the tax-
deductible investment interest expense. Section 163 of the Internal 
Revenue Code allows for a tax deduction for the interest that accrues on 
debt.25 When the fund receives cash in exchange for bonds, agreeing to 
make fixed payments in the future to the bondholder, the fund may 
deduct the fixed payments.26 These reduced taxes are valuable to firms, 
and can account for anywhere between 4% and 40% of a firm’s value.27 
The more a fund leverages, the greater the tax advantage, and with the 
cost of debt so low, this has proved enticing for fund managers.28 
In 2013, three agencies came together to issue guidance to banks 
about leveraged lending.29 In the release, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency discouraged leveraging 
greater than six times a company’s EBITDA (earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization).30 Later on that year, the agencies 
sent letters to about a dozen large lenders, urging them to comply with 
the guidance. 31  In response, Bank of America, Citigroup, and J.P. 
                                                                                                                           
equity funds are formed as LLCs, that the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act has 
an almost identical provision. See id. § 18-1101(c); see also Raju & Remming, supra 
note 22. 
 24. See, e.g., Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1025 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(holding that an LP agreement eliminated the common law duty to disclose in addition 
to all other fiduciary duties). 
 25. I.R.C. § 163 (2012). 
 26. See id. 
 27. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 2, at 15; see Steven Davidoff Solomon, For 
Companies, Tax Code Adds to Debt’s Appeal, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 28, 2012, 
6:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/for-corporations-u-s-tax-code-adds-
to-debts-appeal/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7QXG-6CSE]. 
 28. Felix Barber & Michael Gould, The Strategic Secret of Private Equity, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Sept. 2007, at 53. 
 29. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17,766 (Mar. 22, 
2013). 
 30. Id. at 17,773. 
 31. Gillian Tan, Banks Sit Out Riskier Deals, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014, 8:07 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230430270457933482020153001 
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Morgan, among others, decided against financing some corporate 
takeovers.32 In 2014, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s 
senior deputy comptroller identified private equity as the target of the 
guidance, as well as a cause of “bad practices” that the agencies were 
trying to mitigate.33 
In recent years, firms have taken advantage of the tax-deductible 
expense and reaped the benefits of low borrowing rates. With rates on 
leveraged loans falling to 5.4% in 2014, albeit with a slight raise in 
2015, private equity saw extremely busy years in 2014 and 2015.34 
Private equity fundraising hit $555 billion and $527 billion in 2014 and 
2015, respectively, with just under 50% coming from buyouts.35 
In addition to the favorable treatment of the general partner’s gains, 
the partnership structure allows for the pass-through of losses to equity 
owners, such as the limited partners, but is limited by section 67 of the 
Internal Revenue Code. 36  Moreover, where limited partners are tax-
exempt organizations, such as retirement plans, there will be no taxation 
at the limited partner level. However, this is conditioned on the fund not 
treating the investments producing the gains as debt-financed, and is 
therefore inapplicable to the subject of this Note.37 
3. Carried Interest 
The limited partnership structure also provides various tax benefits, 
some of which have spurned recent debate. First off, limited 
                                                                                                                           
0 [http://perma.cc/UB5C-Y35T]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (“The impact on private equity, a significant driver of what we see as risky 
practices, is an intended consequence of our actions . . . . As regulators, we certainly 
hope to change bad practices and remove the extraordinary froth that’s experienced at 
the peak of a credit cycle. If we can mitigate that, it reduces the size of the valley to 
follow.”). 
 34. BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2016, http://www.bain.com/bai 
nweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf [http://perm 
a.cc/9Q2H-XRR6]; see also BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2015, at 25, 
26 fig.2.2, http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_E 
quity_Report_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/LSM9-UXYG]. 
 35. See BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2016, supra note 34, at 2 & 
fig.1.2. 
 36. Persaud & Atkinson, supra note 14, § 47:3.1[A][5]. 
 37. Id. § 47:3.1[A][2]. 
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partnerships permit a “pass-through” structure for purposes of U.S. 
federal income tax, meaning there is no federal income tax at the entity 
level on either capital gains or other income.38 However, that income 
from the sale of portfolio investments is subject to taxation when it is 
funneled to the general partner and limited partners. 39  If the fund’s 
partners are individuals and the investment had been held for more than 
one year, the gains are taxed once at preferential long-term capital gains 
rates.40 This characteristic of the private equity fund structure has raised 
much political debate over the past fifteen years, with many believing 
these profits, or carried interest, should be treated as ordinary income, 
rather than capital gains.41 
If income generated from ownership interests in partnership funds 
was treated as ordinary income rather than capital gains, it would likely 
be subject to a 35% tax rate—the maximum rate on ordinary income and 
short term capital gains—rather than its current 20% rate.42 Congress 
and other politicians have spent a great deal of time arguing about this 
loophole.43 On one side of the debate, some believe that this is clearly 
ordinary income, compensating the fund managers for their services in 
managing companies and selling them off at a profit, and thus should be 
                                                                                                                           
 38. Id. § 47:3.1[A][1]. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Ryan Ellis, Taxing Carried Interest Capital Gains as Ordinary Income is a 
Very Bad Idea, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2015, 5:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanellis 
/2015/09/04/taxing-carried-interest-capital-gains-as-ordinary-income-is-a-very-bad-
idea/ [http://perma.cc/YN3P-HXJ4]. 
 42. This income was previously taxed at the prior rate for capital gains of 15%. See 
Steven D. Bortnick, Basics of Private Equity Taxation, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Jan. 
17, 2012), http://www.pepperlaw.com/resource/2137/4H1 [http://perma.cc/5LNC-
A944]; Dean Baker & Grover Norquist, Kill the Private-Equity Tax Break, BUSINESS 
WEEK (Aug. 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/2007/07/kill_t 
he_privat.html [http://perma.cc/WPA9-LHFS]. Although the current rate is now at 
20%, the argument in favor of applying the ordinary income rate to income generated 
from ownership interests in partnership funds still stands. See Eileen Appelbaum, 
Private Equity Tax Breaks: How Long Will They Last?, FORTUNE (Apr. 10, 2014, 6:05 
PM), http://fortune.com/2014/04/10/private-equity-tax-breaks-how-long-will-they-last/ 
[http://perma.cc/KE5H-BD2Q]. 
 43. See, e.g., American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, 
111th Cong.; Job Creation and Tax Cuts Act of 2010, S. 3793, 111th Cong. At this 
time, there has been no legislative action to address the tax treatment of carried 
interests. 
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taxed as such.44 On the other hand, some argue that this compensation 
for managers is not a salary because of the risk incurred in their 
investment, and that labor, at times, may receive capital-gains 
treatment.45 However, Congress has yet to pass any laws changing the 
taxation of profits from private equity activities.46 
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FUND LIABILITY FOR PORTFOLIO DEBTS 
1. Federal Fraudulent Transfer Law, State Fraudulent Transfer Law, 
and Unjust Enrichment Claims 
The Bankruptcy Code grants an estate in bankruptcy certain 
avoidance powers for preferential and fraudulent transfers under 
sections 547 and 54847 to protect companies and their creditors from 
certain transactions. 48  Section 547 allows a trustee to avoid as a 
preferential transfer 
any transfer made by an insolvent debtor in the ninety days 
preceding bankruptcy, where the transfer (i) was made to or for the 
benefit of a creditor; (ii) was made for or on account of an 
antecedent debt owed by the debtor; and (iii) enabled the creditor to 
receive more than it otherwise would have under the provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code.49 
Section 548 provides that 
a trustee of a bankruptcy estate may avoid as a constructively 
fraudulent transfer any transfer or obligation incurred by a debtor 
within the two years before the date of the filing of the petition when 
                                                                                                                           
 44. Should Carried Interest Be Taxed as Ordinary Income, Not as Capital Gains?, 
WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023048113 
04577370062392150338?mg=id-wsj [http://perma.cc/QB87-7UUK]. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-548 (2012). 
 48. John Ames et al., Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers Under the Bankruptcy 
Code: A Primer in Pain, in THE AMERICAS RESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY GUIDE 
2008/2009, at 107 (2008). 
 49. Lehman Bros. Holdings v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 469 B.R. 415, 435 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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made in exchange for “less than reasonably equivalent value” and 
that left the debtor insolvent.50 
In 1984, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to include an 
exemption from fraudulent transfer avoidance—section 546(e)—for 
margin payments or settlement payments made between “financial 
participant[s]” in connection with a securities contract that lacked an 
actual intent to defraud.51 
In recent years, the law of fraudulent and preferential transfers has 
been expanded into the private equity context, specifically to overturn 
certain leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”). 52  During the recession in the 
United States, highly leveraged portfolio companies proved unable to 
stay afloat during the economy’s downward spiral, and in turn led 
creditors and debtors to seek to recover payments made to the 
companies’ selling shareholders as part of the LBO.53 Private equity 
firms open themselves to this fraudulent transfer litigation where they 
overvalue a target company and render that company insolvent by 
loading on new debt.54 In these situations, the firm exposes not only the 
acquired company, but also its new investors.55 Both the Second and 
Third Circuits have extended the availability of section 546(e)’s 
                                                                                                                           
 50. Id. 
 51. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e); see Samir D. Parikh, Saving Fraudulent Transfer Law, 86 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 335 (2012). 
 52. See Grant Vingoe, Michael Bernstein & Stewart Aaron, Arnold & Porter LLP, 
Financial Markets Regulatory Roundtable: The Use of Fraudulent Conveyance 
Principles to Overturn LBOs (June 6, 2012), http://files.arnoldporter.com/nyrr-
principles%20to%20overturn%20lbos%20-%20june%206%202012.pdf [http://perma.c 
c/Y3G6-A3YC]. 
 53. Ilkka Perheentupa & Jonathan L. Sagot, Private Equity Alert: Caveat Vendor – 
Mitigating Fraudulent Conveyance Risk, WEIL GOTSHAL, at 1 (May 2010), 
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/private_equity_alert_may_14_2009.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/2PAW-UQHR]. To protect against this type of fraudulent transfer claim, 
selling sponsors can attempt to frame these transactions as “settlement payments” 
within the scope of Section 546(e). Id. at 2. 
 54. Nicholas F. Kajon, Dividend Recaps: Why Some of Today’s Private Equity 
Deals May Become Tomorrow’s Fraudulent Conveyances, STEVENS & LEE (Jan. 20, 
2007), http://www.stevenslee.com/dividend-recaps-why-some-of-todays-private-equity-
deals-may-become-tomorrows-fraudulent-conveyances/ [http://perma.cc/J23P-QX27]. 
 55. Id. 
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exception for settlement payments, 56  while the Eleventh Circuit has 
declined to apply the safe harbor where the financial institution does not 
“acquire[] a beneficial interest in either the [transferred] funds or 
securities.57 
As an alternative to proceeding under section 548, states also have 
their own fraudulent transfers statutes.58 The benefit of these statutes is 
typically a longer claw-back period from which to recover transfers, 
while the major downfall is their requirement for an actual unsecured 
creditor with standing to bring the complaint.59 
In suits where plaintiff creditors bring fraudulent transfer claims, a 
plaintiff may also bring an unjust enrichment claim. 60  For example, 
under New York law, an unjust enrichment claim is unavailable where it 
“duplicates, or replaces, a conventional contact or tort claim,” but such a 
claim will not be dismissed on the basis that they are “duplicative of 
fraudulent transfers claims.” 61  Despite the availability of an unjust 
enrichment claim, this remedy for defrauded creditors is relatively new 
and courts have only recently started to uphold such claims.62 
                                                                                                                           
 56. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. 
Am. United Life Ins. Co. (In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc.), 719 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 
2013); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 516 
(3d Cir. 1999). 
 57. See Munford v. Valuation Res. Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604, 610 
(11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). For a complete discussion regarding the application of 
section 546(e), see Parikh, supra note 51, at 337–48. 
 58. See Avoiding Fraudulent Transfers, VEDDER PRICE, at 4 (2002), 
http://www.vedderprice.com/files/Publication/91c17fac-ae6a-4a05-a16418c97905ee09/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7710c995-93cd-43b0-b62e-5183411bb6fd/Avoidin 
g%20Fraudulent%20Transfers.pdf [http://perma.cc/LF4P-NE3C]. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Hosking v. TPG Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) II SCA) 
(Hosking II), 535 B.R. 543, 585 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Corsello v. Verizon 
N.Y., Inc., 967 N.E.2d 1177, 1185 (N.Y. 2012)). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Compare Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 883 N.E.2d 990, 996 (N.Y. 2008) 
(upholding an unjust enrichment claim’s dismissal where there was “an adequate 
remedy at law”), with Hosking II, 535 B.R. at 585 (upholding an unjust enrichment 
claim where it is “validly pleaded in the alternative” to other claims). 
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2. Sun Capital: Introducing Fund Liability for Portfolio Company 
Obligations 
In Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & 
Trucking Industry Pension Fund, the First Circuit introduced the 
precedent that firms can and should be liable for certain obligations of 
their portfolio companies under a specific set of circumstances.63  In 
2007, two funds of Sun Capital Advisors, Inc.,64 Sun Fund III and Sun 
Fund IV, acquired complete ownership in Scott Brass, Inc. (“SBI”), a 
Rhode Island corporation, which participated in a New England based 
multiemployer pension plan. 65  In 2008, SBI experienced declining 
copper prices, which reduced the value of its inventory and caused it to 
breach its loan covenants and lose its access to credit.66 As a result, it 
stopped contributing to the pension plan, and therefore became liable for 
its proportionate share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits pursuant to 
section 4201 of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”).67 This triggered over $4.5 million in withdrawal liability.68 
However, in November 2008, SBI became the subject of an involuntary 
chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. 69  As a result, the pension plan 
demanded that the two funds owning SBI pay the full amount of 
withdrawal liability, claiming that the funds “entered into a partnership 
or joint venture in common control with SBI and were therefore jointly 
and severally liable for SBI’s withdrawal liability.”70 
In 2010, the funds filed an action in federal court seeking a 
declaration that they were not subject to liability under the two-part 
statutory test required by ERISA.71 The test provides that in order “to 
                                                                                                                           
 63. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. 
Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 139–44 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 64. Sun Capital Partners, Inc. is global private equity firm with over $9.1 billion of 
capital under management. About Us, SUN CAPITAL PARTNERS, INC., http://www.suncap 
part.com/?page_id=10 [http://perma.cc/GXD4-6XKT]. 
 65. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 135–36. 
 66. Id. at 136. 
 67. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 4201, 29 U.S.C. § 
1381 (2012). 
 68. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 136. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 137; see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 
U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1). 
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impose withdrawal liability on an organization other than the one 
obligated to the [pension plan], two conditions must be satisfied: 1) the 
organization must be under common control with the obligated 
organization, and 2) the organization must be a trade or business.”72 The 
district court agreed with the pension plan, basing its decision wholly on 
the second part of this test.73 On appeal, the First Circuit applied an 
“investment plus” approach to evaluate the “trade or business” prong in 
determining whether the funds were more than mere passive investors.74 
After a lengthy discussion, the court held that Sun Fund IV met the 
“trade or business” prong.75 The First Circuit remanded the decision to 
the district court to determine the status of Sun Fund III and to 
determine the issue of common control for both funds.76 
While the decision in Sun Capital turned on liability under a 
statutory test required by ERISA, the court engaged in two important 
discussions regarding general fund liability for portfolio company 
obligations. In the first one, the court addressed the underlying issue in 
the carried interest debate—namely, that because of the fees granted to 
the general partners of funds and the nature of their involvement in the 
funds, they are carrying out a business and should be treated as such 
under the law. 77  In the second discussion, the court introduced an 
important point about the role of the general partner to break the liability 
shield for the partners under Delaware law.78 The court stated: 
Here, the limited partnership agreements gave the Sun Funds’ 
general partners the exclusive authority to act on behalf of the 
limited partnerships to effectuate their purposes. These purposes 
included managing and supervising investments in portfolio 
companies, as well as “other such activity incidental or ancillary 
thereto” as deemed advisable by the general partner. So, under 
Delaware law, it is clear that the general partner of Sun Fund IV, in 
                                                                                                                           
 72. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 138. 
 73. Id. at 137. 
 74. Id. at 141. 
 75. Id. at 148-49. 
 76. The court stated that in order to be considered an employer under ERISA both 
prongs of the test must be met. Id. 
 77. Id. at 143. 
 78. Id. at 146–47. 
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providing management services to SBI, was acting as an agent of the 
Fund.79 
Although the scope of the court’s decision was limited to the 
specific issue of whether the funds could be held liable under ERISA, 
Sun Capital raised an important issue in fund liability for portfolio 
companies that courts will likely face more frequently as private equity 
continues to grow. 
II. THE VARYING RESULTS OF OVERLEVERAGING: HELLAS 
COMMUNICATIONS, COLT DEFENSE, & MARKET TRENDS IN EXITS 
This part provides examples of the varying results that occur when 
funds overleverage their portfolio companies. Part II.A examines Hellas 
Communications. Although the company emerged from bankruptcy and 
is currently operational, it remains the subject of various lawsuits in the 
United States and abroad because of redemptions made by its private 
equity owners prior to the company’s sale.80 Part II.B examines Colt 
Defense, which filed for bankruptcy in June of 2015 and successfully 
reorganized in January 2016.81 Part II.C demonstrates other effects of 
overleveraging through market research; namely, how overleveraging in 
private equity has affected the exit strategies used by firms.82 
A. HELLAS COMMUNICATIONS: A FOREIGN COMPANY WITH DOMESTIC 
APPLICATIONS 
1. About Hellas Communications 
Hellas Communications is one of the largest and most innovative 
telecommunications companies in Greece.83 The company was founded 
in Greece in 1992 and began providing mobile telecommunications 
services in the Greek market in 1993.84 In 1997, the company was the 
                                                                                                                           
 79. Id. at 147. 
 80. See infra Part II.A. 
 81. See infra Part II.B. 
 82. See infra Part II.C. 
 83. The company is now known as WIND Hellas Telecommunications S.A. 
Company Profile, WIND, http://www.wind.gr/en/wind/gia-tin-etaireia/etairiko-profil/ 
[http://perma.cc/E2RG-5DZZ]. 
 84. Id. 
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first to launch prepaid phone service in Greece, and in 2003, it made the 
first 3G call in Greece.85 By the end of 2004, the company had 2.3 
million customers, reported sales of €840 million, and an operating 
income of approximately €121 million.86 
In April 2005, Telecom Italia sold its ownership in Hellas 
Communications to two large global private equity firms, London’s 
Apax Partners (“Apax”) and Texas Pacific Group (“TPG”), for €1.6 
billion (about a 17% premium above share price).87 This was the largest 
leveraged buyout Greece had ever seen, 88  financed mostly through 
borrowed funds from JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank.89 Apax and TPG 
set up multiple entities under Luxembourg law in preparation for the 
acquisition, including “Hellas,” “Hellas I,” and “Hellas II.”90 The firms 
acquired an 80% majority stake in the company through eight 
investment funds and obtained financing through these entities.91 Hellas 
II was the direct owner of Hellas Communications, but Apax and TPG 
used other investment funds to issue debt and redeem its equity stake, as 
described below.92 
 
                                                                                                                           
 85. Id. 
 86. Press Release, Apax Partners, Apax Partners’ Funds and Texas Pacific Group 
to Acquire Control of Tim Hellas Telecommunications S.A. in a 1.1 Billion Euro 
Transaction (Apr. 4, 2005), http://www.apax.com/news/apax-news/2005/april/apax-
partners%E2%80%99-funds-and-texas-pacific-group-to-acquire-control-of-tim-hellas-
telecommunications-sa-in-a-11-billion-euro-transaction/ [http://perma.cc/XR7L-BJZ7]. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Another Greek Tragedy, THE ECONOMIST (June 20, 2015), http://www.economi 
st.com/news/finance-and-economics/21654680-pressure-mounts-two-private-equity-gia 
nts-did-very-well-out-disastrous [http://perma.cc/J5UJ-59GS]. 
 89. Press Release, Apax Partners, supra note 86. 
 90. See Hosking v. TPG Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) II 
SCA) (Hosking I), 524 B.R. 488, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also infra fig.1. 
 91. See Hosking I, 524 B.R. at 497; see also infra fig.1. 
 92. See Hosking I, 524 B.R. at 497; see also infra fig.1 (showing that Hellas II is 
the direct owner of TIM Hellas Communications S.A.). 
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Figure 1: Glimpse at Hellas Communications Ownership 
Structure93 
 
Upon taking a majority equity position in the company, the firms 
began issuing debt and cancelled their equity interests in the portfolio 
company.94 The firms then used Hellas II and other entities to acquire 
another portfolio company, Q-Telecom, a business unit of a large mobile 
network operator in Greece.95 This highly leveraged acquisition closed 
in January 2006.96 The debt was primarily issued by Hellas II.97 The 
                                                                                                                           
 93. Ownership structure is derived from the facts of the case and does not include 
other Hellas entities not pertinent to the discussion. See Hosking I, 524 B.R. at 497. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 497-98. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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firms then began loading up the funds with debt.98 By December 2006, 
Apax and TPG redeemed just shy of €1 billion from debt issuances by 
Hellas I (€973.7 million). 99  This included a redemption of 
“Luxembourgish instrument[s]” called convertible preferred equity 
certificates (“CPECs”) at 35 times their par value.100 In February 2007, 
Apax and TPG sold Hellas and its subsidiaries to the Italian corporation 
Weather Investments S.p.A., later renamed WIND Telecom S.p.A.101 
The sale went for €500 million of equity and €2.9 billion of net debt.102 
At this point, Hellas II’s financial statements reflected that its debt 
obligations had resulted in a loss of more than €259.5 million, and the 
company was leveraged at 12.4 times EBIT (earnings before interest and 
tax).103 By 2009, Hellas II went into administration in the UK.104 
2. Proceedings 
As early as 2012, the liquidators that were appointed to Hellas II 
filed lawsuits against Apax and TPG based on debt issued in 2006.105 
                                                                                                                           
 98. The specifics of these transactions are described in depth in the court’s 
decision. Id. at 497–99. 
 99. Id. at 498; see Gretchen Morgenson, Judge’s Ruling Offers Peek into Private 
Equity’s Secret World, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/0 
6/business/judges-ruling-offers-peek-into-private-equitys-secret-world.html?_r=0 [http: 
//perma.cc/6976-5EW3]. 
 100. Another Greek Tragedy supra note 88. 
 101. Hosking I, 524 B.R. at 498. 
 102. Press Release, Apax Partners, Funds Advised by Apax Partners and TPG 
Announce the Sale of TIM Hellas to Weather Investments (Feb. 7, 2007), 
http://www.apax.com/news/apax-news/2007/february/funds-advised-by-apax-partners-
and-tpg-announce-the-sale-of-tim-hellas-to-weather-investments/ [http://perma.cc/Z2Y 
M-U5CE]. 
 103. Hosking I, 524 B.R. at 498. 
 104. Helia Ebrahimi, Wind Hellas To Be UK’s Biggest Pre-Pack Administration, 
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediate 
chnologyandtelecoms/telecoms/6556553/Wind-Hellas-to-be-UKs-biggest-pre-pack-ad 
ministration.html [http://perma.cc/HGC2-E4JF]. Administration in the UK is similar to 
a chapter 11 proceeding in the United States. Both are designed to rehabilitate the 
company in question and “prevent the creditors’ race for assets by imposing a 
moratorium against individual creditor actions.” Jodie A. Kirshner, Design Flaws in the 
Bankruptcy Regime: Lessons from the U.K. for Preventing a Resurgent Creditors’ Race 
in the U.S., 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 527, 534 (2015). 
 105. See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
2016]                                PRIVATE EQUITY'S                                   625 
                OVERLEVERAGING OF PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 
The suits include: Luxembourg Commercial Court claims, 106  U.S. 
bankruptcy court proceedings,107 New York federal court proceedings in 
the Southern District,108 and a New York state court judgment.109 
In September 2014, the New York Supreme Court granted 
summary judgment for certain holders of Hellas Communications debt 
securities (via the indenture trustee—Wilmington Trust Co. (“WTC”)—
and Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp., an assignee for collection).110 The 
court granted the judgment for recovery of principal and interest under 
the indenture despite dismissing fraudulent conveyance claims for the 
plaintiffs’ lack of standing. 111  However, this judgment remained 
outstanding as of March 2016, as the named Hellas entities had gone 
completely bankrupt.112 
In December 2014, WTC received U.S. District Judge J. Paul 
Oetken’s permission to pursue more entities tied to Hellas 
Communications for unpaid debt, which WTC asserts can be traced 
back to the private equity giants who stripped Hellas.113 Although Judge 
Oetken initially dismissed the case in March 2014 due to lack of 
complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, he agreed to 
reopen the case and allow an amended complaint that dropped certain 
foreign parties.114 These parties, which included Apax subsidiaries, filed 
                                                                                                                           
 106. See Corporate Finance & Insolvency Litigation – Hellas Case: Court Rejects 
Claim, KLEYR GRASSO (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.kleyrgrasso.com/scpt_news/hellas-
case/ [http://perma.cc/E9SV-AUGK]. The Luxembourg Commercial Court rejected all 
claims by the Hellas liquidators, asserting that (1) the redemption of the CPECs, the 
instruments in question, “could not be requalified as illegal dividend distributions to the 
shareholders” as they were debt instruments, and (2) the repurchase price of the CPECs 
were not fraudulent, but rather were independently verified to the approval of the 
Luxembourg Court back in 2006. See id. 
 107. See, e.g., Hosking v. TPG Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) 
II SCA) (Hosking II), 535 B.R. 543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 108. Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Aliberti, No. 12-CV-8686 (JPO), 2014 WL 
6907548 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2014). 
 109. Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.á.r.l, 996 N.Y.S.2d 476 
(Sup. Ct. 2014). 
 110. Id. at 498. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Jeff Zalesin, Hellas Noteholders OK’d for New $565M Complaint in PE Row, 
LAW360 (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/723100/hellas-noteholders-
ok-d-for-new-565m-complaint-in-pe-row [http://perma.cc/9Q7A-XQDG]. 
 113. Aliberti, 2014 WL 6907548, at *3; Zalesin, supra note 112. 
 114. Aliberti, 2014 WL 6907548, at *1; Zalesin, supra note 112. 
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a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting the case 
belongs in Europe where many claims have already been dismissed, but 
as of this writing there has been no decision on the issue.115 
In the U.S. bankruptcy court proceedings, the plaintiffs assert that 
the company did not have sufficient earnings to cover the various 
payouts to Apax and TPG’s subsidiaries, and, accordingly, such 
payments should be clawed back as a fraudulent transfer.116 Meanwhile, 
Apax and TPG claim that the company was in perfectly good health 
when it was sold in 2007, and the reason the plaintiffs’ debt instruments 
defaulted was solely a result of the financial crisis.117 In the press release 
regarding the sale, the funds even stated, “During Apax’s and TPG’s 
period of ownership, the company was successfully turned round and set 
on a growth trajectory leading to a significant improvement in all 
financial and operating key metrics.”118 Despite Apax and TPG’s best 
efforts, in early 2015, Judge Martin Glenn granted in part and denied in 
part four motions to dismiss the complaint in the bankruptcy court 
proceedings.119 In August of the same year, Judge Glenn granted the 
liquidators a motion to amend their complaint to add new defendants 
and assert new claims against the proposed defendants and the original 
defendants, and to withdraw certain other claims and other defendants 
from the proceedings.120 
                                                                                                                           
 115. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 
Aliberti, 2014 WL 6907548 (No. 12-CV-8686 (JPO)); Jenna Ebersole, Cos. Want PE 
Row Over $565M Judgment Tossed, LAW360 (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/749547/cos-want-pe-row-over-565m-judgment-tossed [http://perma.cc/2G5E-J 
SPD]; William Louch, Luxembourg Court Rules in Favour of Apax, TPG in Hellas 
Case, FIN. NEWS (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2015-12-
24/hellas-ii-apax-tpg-luxembourg-ruling [http://perma.cc/4UE9-A8MX]. 
 116. Morgenson, supra note 99. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Press Release, Apax Partners, supra note 102. 
 119. The complaint was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction as to Apax and 
foreign-based entities affiliated with Apax and TPG. The court also dismissed 
fraudulent transfer claims for lack of standing. However, the court concluded that 
personal jurisdiction could be exercised over each of the United States-based 
defendants. Hosking v. TPG Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) II 
SCA) (Hosking I), 524 B.R. 488, 536 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Hosking v. TPG 
Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) II SCA) (Hosking II), 535 B.R. 
543, 551 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining the procedural background of Hosking I). 
 120. Hosking II, 535 B.R. at 595-96. 
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3. Analysis: A Precedent Set for the Industry 
 According to emails cited by Judge Glenn in his bankruptcy court 
decision to uphold complaints against Hellas, certain employees within 
TPG were aware of the damage to be done to Hellas II upon the 
execution of the 2006 debt issuances. 121  One email from a TPG 
executive to an employee at Apax stated that they would be “putting the 
business under huge pressure,” while another warned of the dangerous 
position Hellas II would find itself in should the redemption occur.122 In 
addition, there were various inconsistencies in the 2006 debt offerings, 
such as the prospectus’ description of the issuance as a repayment of 
“deeply subordinated shareholder loans,” when there were no 
shareholder loans listed on the company’s balance sheet.123 Thus, it is 
likely that the case of Hellas II did not just involve a typical 
overleveraging of a portfolio company, but also fraudulent practices. 
The situation highlights the extreme practices that the private equity 
fund structure will allow. 
While the parallel case in Luxembourg determined whether the 
payout was a breach of the country’s corporate laws,124 the New York 
trials still will be important for fund managers. The outcome could 
prove useful in deterring them from this type of extreme overleveraging, 
in which firms extract funds from a company for a large, short-term 
payoff, leaving creditors with an empty promise of debt that is unable to 
be repaid.125 Before Apax and TPG purchased the company, at the year 
ended December 31, 2004, Hellas Communications had a debt to equity 
ratio of 1.09 (in thousands of euro, 709,672 total liabilities/650,019 
                                                                                                                           
 121. Id. at 579-81. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Gretchen Morgenson, Private Equity’s Trojan Horse of Debt, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/business/14gret.html [http://perm 
a.cc/2RYP-DX9K]. 
 124. Louch, supra note 115; see also Morgenson, supra note 99. 
 125. Had Hellas II been a domestic fund, such as a Delaware LP, with direct on-
shore investors, the court would also address the issue of whether the leveraged 
recapitalization was a fraudulent transaction under U.S. bankruptcy law. See Eva Davis 
& Hamed Meshki, Trends in Private Equity Exits, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/ARTICLE%20PDF%20-%20PRINTIN 
G%20ALLOWED%20-%20PLC%20-%20E%20Davis.pdf [http://perma.cc/BD9Z-4RF 
P]. 
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Shareholders equity). 126  At the year ended December 31, 2006, 
immediately prior to the sale by Apax and TPG, but following Hellas 
II’s debt issuance to the firms, Hellas Communications found itself with 
a debt to equity ratio of 68.1 (in thousands of euro, 1,988,267 total 
liabilities/29,208 total equity). 127  That leverage ratio increased the 
following year after the sale of Hellas Communications.128 After the 
departure of Apax and TPG, the company went through a very complex, 
global restructuring in 2010, with its bondholders taking 100% of the 
company’s shares in return for waiving a €1.225 billion debt 
obligation.129 
B. COLT DEFENSE: A SUCCESSFUL INVESTMENT, DESPITE LEVERAGE AND 
DEFAULT 
Colt’s Manufacturing Company is “one of the world’s oldest most 
renowned designers, developers and manufacturers of firearms.”130 The 
company traces its roots back to 1836, when the company’s founder, 
Sam Colt, opened his first factory in Paterson, NJ, where he developed 
and produced the pocket, belt, and holster model pistols along with two 
types of rifles.131 By 1847, Colt received his first government order from 
the U.S. Ordnance Department for one thousand of his pistols.132 In 
1851, Colt became the first American manufacturer to open a plant in 
England, incorporating under the name of Colt’s Patent Fire Arms 
Manufacturing Company. 133  The company has been manufacturing 
firearms since its inception, arming American officers in both World 
                                                                                                                           
 126. TIM HELLAS TELECOMMS. S.A., ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 16 (2004). 
 127. TIM HELLAS TELECOMMS. S.A., ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at F-49 to F-50 (2006). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Anousha Sakoui, Wind Hellas Secures Debt Revamp, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 18, 
2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1a77f54c-dab6-11df-81b0-00144feabdc0.html#a 
xzz3t9Iupy88 [http://perma.cc/N63P-PNUG]. See generally Colin Chang et al., WIND 
Hellas: A Complex Restructuring in a Global Recession, WHITE & CASE LLP (Feb. 24, 
2011), http://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/artic 
le_wind_hellas_complex_restructuring.pdf [http://perma.cc/2BSK-ZZCT] (providing 
an in-depth look at the restructuring). 
 130. Colt Defense LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 20, 2014). 
 131. History, COLT, http://www.colt.com/Company/History [http://perma.cc/4BZU-
XG3S]. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.134 Despite its rich history 
as a pioneer in the gun industry, much of the company’s history has 
been plagued by commercial crisis.135 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Colt’s Manufacturing Company and other 
American gun manufacturers began to lose large government contracts 
to foreign gun makers.136 In 1992, the company filed for bankruptcy 
court protection. 137  In 1994, the company found a buyer in Donald 
Zilkha, a wealthy Manhattan-based Iraqi banker from the family 
investment firm Zilkha & Co., who purchased Colt for a mere $27 
million.138 Although Zilkha had hoped to help consolidate the market 
and acquire some foreign gun producers, in the end, his efforts proved 
futile.139 This was most evident when his hand-picked CEO made a set 
of proposals that riled up Second Amendment activists, followed by the 
failure of the company’s “smart gun.”140 By 2002, a Greek banker at 
Zilkha & Co., Ionnis Rigas, had started handling much of the oversight 
of Colt’s Manufacturing Company.141 Rigas had formed his own firm, 
Sciens Capital Management (“Sciens”), holding investment interests in 
Athens and London, and saw an opportunity with Colt’s Manufacturing 
Company.142 He arranged for a spinoff of the military business into what 
is now known as Colt Defense.143 
Sciens would put Colt Defense through “the private equity leverage 
wringer,” loading the company with debt while receiving cash 
distributions.144 According to Bloomberg BusinessWeek, the following 
were the highlights of the Colt Defense series of debt-financings: 
The 2005 SEC filing shows payouts totaling $40 million over the 
two prior years—a significant amount for a company in such fragile 
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financial health. In 2006, another SEC filing shows, the company 
redeemed “members’ equity” worth $41 million. In 2007, Colt 
Defense agreed to borrow $150 million in a “leveraged 
recapitalization” that featured distributions to “members” of $131 
million. In 2009 it borrowed an additional $250 million, while 
multimillion-dollar payouts continued. For 2010, Colt Defense had 
sales of $176 million—more than double what they were in 2004—
but registered an $11 million loss.145 
These transactions elicited suspicion from people like Merrick 
Alpert, an advisor and, later, senior vice president of Colt’s 
Manufacturing Company, who said, “You didn’t have to work at Colt 
Defense to know it had put itself in a dire situation.”146 Despite signs of 
hope for increased revenues, Sciens’ attempt to turnaround Colt Defense 
failed.147 The company had issued too much debt and, by 2014, it sought 
an additional $4.1 million in liquidity from Morgan Stanley to make a 
$10.9 million interest payment to bondholders in November.148 At this 
point, it was clear that Colt Defense would be unable to meet its bond 
obligations due in May 2015 without restructuring the debt. 149  The 
company finally filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in June 2015 
in the wake of various accounting problems and the failure to complete 
its annual SEC filing.150 Unlike the case in Hellas Communications, Colt 
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Defense’s creditors included 2700 “mom and pop” bondholders who 
represented about one quarter of the value of the bond debt.151 This 
further complicated Colt Defense’s efforts to reach a deal without filing 
for bankruptcy.152 
Unlike its earlier bankruptcy in the 1990s, however, Colt Defense 
was able to escape a fire sale by successfully planning and exiting from 
an accelerated chapter 11 restructuring.153 Showing signs of life by late 
September 2015, the company was awarded a $212 million multi-year 
contract with the U.S. Department of Defense.154  On November 10, 
2015, the company announced the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Delaware’s approval of its disclosure statement for plan of 
reorganization. 155  The plan received the support of Sciens and the 
owners of more than 60% of Colt’s senior outstanding notes due in 
2017. 156  In January 2016, the company successfully emerged from 
restructuring.157 
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The case of Colt Defense is very unique from most private equity 
leveraged portfolio companies. For one, Sciens had held its ownership 
stake in Colt Defense for over fifteen years, and offered to buy out up to 
$108 million in senior loans and $20 million in bankruptcy financing if 
bondholders would accept a 55% haircut on their debt. 158  This was 
perhaps Sciens’ most profitable move at the time for Colt Defense so as 
to retain its investment.159 Had Sciens sold off Colt Defense following 
its leveraged recapitalization in 2007, as Apax and TPG did in the case 
of Hellas Communications, Colt Defense’s creditors would have likely 
found themselves in the same situation as those of Hellas 
Communications, with little opportunity for redress.160 
C. MARKET TRENDS AMONG PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: HOW LEVERAGING 
AFFECTS THE EXIT STRATEGY 
As lower interest rates led to increased leverage among portfolio 
companies similar to those described above, 161  they simultaneously 
brought a sharp increase in the number and value of exits by the 
investing firms. 162  2014 had a record $456 billion in buyout-backed 
exits, and 2015 came in just under at $422 billion.163 This section briefly 
addresses the exit trends that funds have used in recent years, including 
IPOs, strategic secondary sales, and the leveraged recapitalization plans. 
According to the Bain & Company Global Private Equity Report 
for 2015, 2014 was “the year of the exit,”164 partially due to the rise in 
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IPOs and strategic secondary sales.165 While many of these exits can be 
explained by the global economy’s general recovery over the past few 
years,166 the increase can be explained, in part, by near-zero interest 
rates.167 The increase in buyout-backed exits via IPOs and strategic sales 
is due to the desire of managers to take advantage of rates while they are 
low. 168  The United States expects to see a very slow path to rate 
increases.169 When the rates rise, private equity investment will become 
less appealing and more expensive.170 For now, private equity firms are 
taking advantage of favorable valuations, and hope to free up capital, 
and make further investments while the cost of borrowing is low.171 “A 
slow rise in rates means sellers who cash out will still have good reason 
to put their money back to work through acquisitions, since fixed 
income investments will still offer low yields, and the equity market has 
again shown it can swiftly transform into a sea of volatility.” 172 
Additionally, interest rates affect the market for public offerings, and it 
has been projected that the IPO market will slow as interest rates rise.173 
Similarly, the market for strategic secondary sales is more appealing in 
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the face of low interest rates.174 Corporate M&A remains one of the 
most popular exit strategies for private equity and is expected to 
continue to thrive as long as rates remain low.175 
Lastly, the case of Hellas Communications shed a great deal of 
negative light on a partial exit method—the leveraged recapitalization.176 
Leveraged recapitalization is a strategy in which a company “takes on 
significant additional debt with the purpose of either paying a large 
dividend or repurchasing shares,” resulting in an overleveraged 
company.177 The leveraged recapitalization by Apax and TPG in Hellas 
Communications drew criticism because of the immediate sale after 
overleveraging.178 That, however, is not the ideal situation in a leveraged 
recapitalization; rather, a leveraged recapitalization works well where a 
company’s growth rate is increasing and the owners are trying to obtain 
some liquidity while maintaining the ownership position.179 
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III. WHAT TO DO ABOUT OVERLEVERAGING: DUTY TO ENSURE 
COMPANY DEBTS ARE PAID 
One option to deter private equity firms from overleveraging 
portfolio companies would be to eliminate the tax-deductible interest 
expense and raise taxes on carried interest.180 This proposal has been at 
the forefront of various presidential candidates’ tax plans in the 
upcoming 2016 election.181 However, this is an answer geared toward 
limiting profit windfalls for private equity giants in leveraging 
companies and appeasing the general public’s distrust of Wall Street, 
rather than ensuring that debt in overleveraged portfolio companies will 
be repaid. This Note instead advocates for a solution that enhances 
fiduciary duties to ensure that a target company’s debts are paid by 
parties already involved in the transactions via either the general partner 
or the indenture trustee.182 
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A. INTRODUCING FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
As previously discussed, Delaware law favors the freedom to 
contract around fiduciary duties in the LP and LLC setting.183 In recent 
years, Delaware courts have created ambiguity over whether the 
managers of LLCs may also have default fiduciary duties to the 
company, leaving the legislature ample opportunity to address this 
issue.184 However, the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to address the 
issue.185 Given the similar nature of LLCs and LPs, and the similarities 
between the applicable provisions for fiduciary duties in the Delaware 
Code,186 LP fiduciary duties deserve an equal look here. It is important 
to note that while a person serving on the board of a portfolio company 
has a duty to the private equity fund employer, there is no reciprocal 
duty for the general partner to the portfolio company.187  Rather, the 
general partner only has limited fiduciary duties of care and loyalty with 
respect to the limited partners, and generally must maximize the return 
on their investment.188 Sometimes these duties supersede the long-term 
interests of the portfolio company, such as obligations to long-term 
creditors as evidenced in Hellas Communications. 
By creating such a fiduciary duty, general partners would not be 
able to issue debt from the LP and then redeem their own securities, as 
such a redemption would certainly constitute a breach of fiduciary duty 
by Delaware corporate law standards. 189  While extending fiduciary 
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duties to an LP may be an unfavorable idea, 190  it is hardly an 
unreasonable response. 
B. EXPANDING THE INDENTURE TRUSTEE’S DUTIES AND POWERS 
Under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (the “TIA”), prior to a 
default, the duties of an indenture trustee are ministerial and narrow, 
limited to “such duties as are specifically set out in [the] indenture.”191 
The TIA underutilizes the indenture trustee, who is in a unique position 
to oversee that debt issuances are not made in vain, or without a chance 
for repayment. Rather, the indenture trustee should be positioned as 
what has previously been coined a “supertrustee” with “extensive 
monitoring rights” that include monitoring compliance with the bond 
indenture.192 Thus, where an issuer engages in behavior that makes it 
clear that there will be no payment of principal and interest, the trustee 
would have a duty to take action against the issuer on behalf of the 
noteholder beneficiaries. 
CONCLUSION 
As evidenced, overleveraging in private equity is not always a 
problem, but can become one when fund managers engage in behavior 
that strips a portfolio company of its assets. Something must be done to 
deter this type of behavior. With interest rates remaining at near floor 
levels, private equity is expected to see continued growth in the 
upcoming years, and accordingly, without a change, the same trends in 
portfolio bankruptcies and overleveraging that come alongside a boom 
in private equity activity will likely continue. While 2017 is expected to 
bring about that change through tax code reform,193 more is certainly 
needed to counteract certain devastating results that may occur with 
overleveraging, as seen in the case of Hellas Communications. Although 
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the courts have started to realize that private equity funds should be held 
accountable for company debts through the application of fraudulent 
transfer law and where ERISA assets are managed, there is more work 
to be done. Creditors of private equity investments should have a 
mechanism in place so as to avoid spending years in bankruptcy court 
with a private equity giant settling debts with creditors. The proposals 
outlined in this Note are such a mechanism that should be considered. 
